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Abstract
The main focus of the literature on the economics of parking has been on the cruising-for-parking
externality and garage market power. However, all studies to date assume the existence of perfect
information. Yet, imperfect information may well arise as drivers: (1) may not be aware of all the
options available in their choice set; and (2) lack the information required to evaluate them, thus
exacerbating the aforementioned distortions. We provide compelling evidence for the existence of
information frictions in this market by examining the case of Barcelona, and we test whether users’
lack of knowledge translates into undesirable market outcomes.
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1.0 Introduction
Parking policy has recently attracted much attention, as it is seen as both a convenient and
effective travel demand management tool for boosting the efficiency of transport systems
that seek to tackle car usage-related problems. However, the complex behaviour of the
parking market is not readily assessed, and policy makers require support as they attempt
to design policies that might drive the market towards efficiency. This need has given rise to
a growing body of literature, largely focused on the analysis of parking market distortions
and on ways of fixing them.
The general tendency to set low (or free) kerbside prices translates into excessive parking
demand, which forces some drivers to cruise around for an empty spot and where each
parker imposes an external cost on all other drivers (search cost). This phenomenon is
pervasive (Shoup, 2005; van Ommeren et al., 2012) and its associated welfare loss is
especially relevant (Inci et al., 2017).1 An additional distortion is the fact that garage
parking (the main alternative to kerbside parking) is characterised by construction scale
economies for garages, that imposes their discrete spacing and that confers on them
some degree of localised market power (Arnott, 2006). Theoretical studies have suggested
various policy interventions to achieve full efficiency (for example, the elimination of
cruising) or, at least, to induce welfare gains. These include regulating the price differential
between garage and kerbside parking, differentiated hourly kerbside parking fees, time-
varying and uniform kerbside parking fees (see Inci, 2015, for an extensive review).
However, these conclusions rely on the assumption that parkers have perfect infor-
mation. Spatial competition models (see, for example, Arnott, 2006; Calthrop and
Proost, 2006; Inci and Lindsey, 2015) assume that drivers choose whether to search for
an empty kerbside spot or whether to drive directly to a garage. This implies that only
the kerbside parking search is costly, while the time required to locate a garage and to
park there is neglected. Thus, such models implicitly assume that garage locations and
their attributes (such as price) are known and perfectly observed by drivers, but a closer
inspection of the parking market calls into question the validity of this assumption.
It is quite plausible that imperfect information may arise from the fact that drivers: (1)
may not know all the available options in their parking choice set; and (2) lack information
to evaluate them (prices and quality). Even if they want to acquire this knowledge, they
must undertake a certain amount of search, which is also costly. The absence (or limitation)
of this information does not allow them to maximise their utility and this has consequences
on market outcomes that have not, to the best of our knowledge, been considered before.
The importance of imperfect information for market failure in a wide variety of sectors
has long been recognised in the information economics literature (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof,
1970; Diamond, 1971; Stiglitz, 1989, 2000 and 2002), and the car parking market is no
exception. Information is costly, so it is rational that consumers will not be fully informed.
In such a situation, markets tend to be characterised by price dispersions that cannot be
1Shoup (2005) shows that about 30 per cent of trips are affected and that drivers spend, on average, eight minutes
cruising. Van Ommeren et al. (2012) suggest that cruising is mainly a parking regulation issue, as cities with
kerbside regulated parking spaces and a proper fare differential with respect to garages report almost no cruising
levels. Inci et al. (2015) estimate the external cost of cruising to be about 15 per cent of the average wage rate in the
case of Istanbul (equivalent to $2.7/hr in the USA).
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explained by differences in product characteristics. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) suggest that
when individuals have different search costs, low-price firms will sell to both the well-
informed customers and the uninformed customers that have the chance to purchase
there (random); while high-price firms will only be able to sell to the uninformed con-
sumers. In this case, imperfect information allows firms imperfectly to discriminate
consumers depending on their respective information levels.2 Garages will take advantage
of non-optimal choice decisions made by consumers, allowing them to charge higher prices
even with a large number of firms in the market or when search costs are relatively low.
Furthermore, garages can also act strategically, increasing the consumers’ search costs
through obfuscation — that is, simply by not disclosing all relevant purchase information
or by making it more complex to understand; and, so, they are able to increase their prices
(Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012). All this suggests that the parking market distortions
described above (cruising and localised market power) might be further exacerbated by
the interplay with imperfect information. In this scenario, full efficiency cannot be attained
even if the interventions suggested by theory are implemented, as some cruising is likely to
remain.
The presence of imperfect information in the parking market can be inferred from the
fact that there is a growing demand for this good, with many specialist, information-
gathering start-up firms currently providing it as pre-trip or in-route information.3 The
parking behaviour literature has focused on measuring the parking search and character-
ising the strategies adopted by drivers (see, for example, Polak and Axhausen, 1990;
Bonsall and Palmer, 2004; Karaliopoulos et al., 2017; Weinberger et al., 2017). The
relevance of the parking search issue and recent technological developments have
motivated a large body of literature devoted to the design of parking assistance systems
(see Caicedo, 2009, 2010; and Shin and Jun, 2014), which constitute information provision
and guidance tools for drivers aimed at reducing their search cost.
However, all previous studies seem to assume implicitly that parkers know the spatial/
temporal availability and characteristics of the garage stock as the primary substitute for
kerbside parking. However, it is our contention that the impact of imperfect information
on market outcomes has yet to be addressed in the parking literature — that is, no attention
has been given to the impact on drivers of the lack of information regarding garage prices
and ‘quality’.
In this paper, we report evidence regarding the existence, and degree, of information
frictions in the garage market of Barcelona. Moreover, we examine whether this level of
information affects garage-choice behaviour that translates into market outcomes
(prices). We find that information frictions are so pervasive that active searching during
a given trip does not help drivers reduce the fees they pay. Only passive information acqui-
sition through experience seems to increase parkers’ knowledge of the available garage
stock and so to obtain cheaper parking options. We also find evidence of price obfuscation
that might allow garage operators to exploit the consumers’ lack of knowledge.
2The authors stress that well-informed consumers impose a positive externality on uninformed consumers by
incentivising the existence of low-price firms. If there are enough well-informed consumers, the market equilibrium
price will tend to the competitive price.
3Examples of such firms include Parkopedia, ParkMe, SpotHero, and Bestparking.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse imperfect information
distortions in the parking sector. Our findings constitute a relevant contribution both to
theoretical parking models, which seek to account for the exacerbating distortions of
cruising externality and garage market power, and to empirical studies concerned with
parking competition and demand modelling. They also suggest the need to empirically
test whether imperfect information can be considered as relevant an issue in other cities.
Addressing existing information frictions shows itself to be a relevant policy issue if parking
market efficiency is to be achieved and one that deserves more attention in future research.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the parking market in
Barcelona and the drivers’ level of knowledge, and presents evidence for the latter and for
parkers’ search costs. Section 3 reports our empirical test of the role played by information
on the prices paid by parkers and discusses these results. Section 4 summarises our main
conclusions.
2.0 Barcelona’s Parking Market and Garage Parkers’ Knowledge Levels
Barcelona operates comprehensive kerbside parking regulations covering almost the entire
city area (ÀREA). Introduced in 2005 and expanded in 2009, these regulations include
dedicated spaces for commercial activities, mixed-use spaces (where residents are permitted
to park but visitors are charged a fee), resident-exclusive spaces, and spaces assigned to
haulage activities. The current global kerbside parking supply is about 140,000 car park
spaces (DB Aj.BCN, 2015), 52,000 of which are regulated following BSM-provided
information.4 These spaces are distributed across regulatory zones with four fee/hour
bands for commercial spaces (from E1.08–E2.50/hr) and two bands for mixed-use
spaces (E2.75–E3/hr). In the case of commercial spaces all parkers are considered as visi-
tors, while mixed-use spaces allow both visitors and residents to park (the latter at a
reduced fee of E0.20/day). Free parking only remains available during operating hours
in the city’s outskirts, where parking demand is much lower.
Off-street parking supply in Barcelona is extensive, with a global estimated figure of
650,000 parking spaces (DB Aj.BCN, 2015). However, according to Albalate and
Gragera (2017), only about 114,000 spaces are provided by public-access garages. The
public-access garage supply is provided mainly by the private sector (78 per cent of
facilities) in what is a highly atomised market structure. Thus, two firms, NN and
SABA, which manage a relatively large number of garages under the same brand name
and image, account for just 5 per cent and 3 per cent of the market, respectively. The
public sector is characterised by public operators (8 per cent) and price-regulated facilities
under concession (14 per cent). Indeed, in recent years, the public sector has been the only
new market entrant in the city’s policy of expanding off-street supply as a means of shifting
kerbside demand to garages, because of high land acquisition costs (which the public sector
have been able to circumvent by building garages on public land). The City Council has
integrated both regulated kerbside spaces and publicly managed garages under a single
4Of the global city parking supply, about 73,000 are free parking spaces; the remaining include haulage and other
reserved spaces where regular car parkers are not allowed to park.
Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Information in the Parking Market Albalate and Gragera
325
operator (BSM), although each mode represents a different business unit within the same
company.
Garages charge a fee per minute, although many differentiate the fee charged according
to the length of stay. Indeed, some fee schedules are so complex that they appear to interfere
with the consumers’ ability to calculate the price. The city’s mean garage parking fee for the
first hour is E3.32/hr (std. dev. = E0.50/hr), falling to E3.19/hr for a two-hour stay and
E3.14/hr for three hours. This represents a fairly mild price discrimination, as the reduction
for the second and third hours is just 4 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively.5 Generally
discounts for long, overnight, and next-day stays are reported on the garages’ price schedule
or menu. Likewise, discounts and special rates can be purchased in advance, but non-
discount users represent the majority of parking transactions (according to figures reported
by BSM, see footnote 17 in Albalate and Gragera, 2017). The prices charged by public
garages are fixed by the public authority and respond solely to political decisions.
Publicly managed garages apply a E3.05/hr fee (non-progressive) in all their facilities.
All concessions are subject to a price-cap regulation that is usually binding, ensuring
cost recovery and return on investment to the private investor. The concessions’ mean
fee for the first hour of parking is E3.09/hr (std. dev. E0.38/hr).
Further details on the specific characteristics of the parking market in Barcelona can be
found in Gragera and Albalate (2016) and Albalate and Gragera (2017).
To evaluate the level of knowledge that parkers have about the parking market, we
conducted a survey among 576 respondents among the garage parkers at 61 different
facilities located throughout Barcelona, but concentrated mainly in the Central Business
District and surrounding areas.6 The specific survey locations are shown in Figure 1. We
designed the questionnaire in such a way as to gather information on garage parkers’
trip and demographic characteristics, their search activity, and their knowledge of prices
and available alternatives. The information was gathered in a single wave over two con-
secutive weeks in February 2016, during business hours. The survey was conducted with
parkers that were either about to leave the garage facility after parking their vehicle or
when they returned to pick it up (before payment). Garage prices and characteristics are
extracted from a parking inventory conducted during the same period, as described in
Albalate and Gragera (2017). Kerbside information has been provided by BSM and the
neighbourhood data is made publicly available by the Barcelona City Council Statistics
Department.
2.1 Descriptive evidence of imperfect information
2.1.1 Involvement in search activity
In line with previous evidence (Albalate and Gragera, 2017), our survey data suggest that a
garage might exert a significant degree of localised market power, as 96.6 per cent of
5A comparison of these figures with those reported by Lin and Wang (2015) for the case of New York City is
striking. In Manhattan, the mean fee for the first hour is $12.67/hr (std. dev. $4.40/hr) while the second hour is
charged at just $3.38/hr, a reduction of 73 per cent.
6All empirical evidence is based on a sample that discarded responses from car park subscribers, parkers who
report paying a discounted fee of any kind, and all-day parkers. Each model uses only those observations for
which complete information was available for all variables used, which means that items for which respondents
were unable/unwilling to report specific information were eliminated.
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respondents reveal that their main reason for parking in a given facility is its proximity to
their destination. The average walking time to final destination is restricted to just 5.8 min
(std. dev. 5.5 min), which assuming a walking speed of 0.5 m/s translates into a 300 m walk
(with more than 90 per cent of respondents not walking further than 500 m). Walking time
distribution in our sample is reported in Figure 2.
Figure 1
Geographical Distribution of Garage Facilities and the Total Raw Number of Surveys Conducted
at Each of Them
Figure 2
Walking Time to Destination Density Distribution, as Reported by Parkers in Our Sample
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Table 1 shows that parkers in our sample conduct very low search activity of all types.
Only 6.9 per cent of respondents report having actively searched for a garage. Choice of
garage facility seems to depend largely on previous experience, as 78 per cent report that
they already knew the facility, while the others report having found it either by following
traffic signs (5 per cent) or on seeing the garage sign while cruising around the area
(17 per cent). Only 3.4 per cent state that they conducted any sort of pre-trip search for
garage information, reflecting the fact that information platforms (start-up firms) currently
have a very low market penetration. About 17.8 per cent of respondents report that they
had previously searched for a kerbside spot, while only a marginal 1.2 per cent state they
searched for both a garage and an empty kerbside spot. Further analysis of our data
shows that no demographic or trip characteristics present a significant difference in the
mean level of garage search.
2.1.2 Knowledge of available garage alternatives
The low level of search activity reported is particularly striking, as our survey data suggest
that drivers have a significant lack of knowledge about their alternative parking options.
Only 51 per cent of parkers report knowing of the existence of at least one other garage
in the area, but as many as 78 per cent of these claim not to know the fee that this
garage facility would charge them, and 65 per cent report not knowing its characteristics.
Together with localised market power, this might plausibly impose a huge burden on
competition between garages, as suggested by the results of Albalate and Gragera (2017).
To gain further insights into these responses, we test whether the differences in the mean
level of knowledge about the availability of alternative garages between the different groups
in our sample are statistically significant (see Table 2). The mean knowledge of available
alternatives is higher among those who have previously visited the specific garage facility
compared to those who have not, providing further evidence of the accumulation of knowl-
edge of available alternatives through experience. This is also the case of those who under-
took an active search for a garage, while the opposite was found for those who had
previously searched for a kerbside spot. The fact that the latter looked to park on the
Table 1
Summary of Respondents’ Answers to Search Activity-related Issues in Our Sample
Search activity Freq. Percentage
Garage search (No) 458 93.09
(Yes) 34 6.91
Pre-trip search (No) 476 96.55
(Yes) 17 3.45
Kerbside search (No) 410 82.16
(Yes) 89 17.84
How they found it? (Already know) 385 78.09
(Traffic signs) 25 5.07
(Cruising) 83 16.84
Previous visitor (No) 106 21.37
(Yes) 390 78.63
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kerbside spot first might indicate that this is their preferred option and that they are less
likely to park in a garage (having less prior experience). This is, in fact, confirmed by
comparing means between both groups with a t-test.
2.1.3 Knowledge of prices
Not only do the parkers seem to know little about the available alternatives and their
characteristics, they also lack knowledge about the fees charged in the garage in which
they have parked. Our survey data suggest that 75 per cent of respondents report not
knowing the fees. When asked the fee for the first hour, their average guess was E2.92/hr
(std. dev. E0.96/hr) compared to a true sample mean of E3.18/hr (std. dev. E0.33/hr),
there being no statistically different mean between those reporting knowing and those
reporting not knowing the price. We measure their price misperception as the difference
between their guess and the actual fee applied at the garage, which gives an average of
−E0.27/hr (std. dev. E1.04/hr); its distribution is reported in Figure 3.
Table 2
One-tailed and Two-tailed T-test Results Comparing Levels of Knowledge of Available Garage Alternatives for
Different Independent Subsamples Based on Parkers’ Experience and Search Involvement
Knowledge of garage alternatives
Parkers’ characteristic Freq. Mean Std. Dev. t Pr(T , t) Pr(|T| . |t|) Pr(T . t)
Previous visit (0) 106 0.292 0.457 −5.292 0.000 0.000 1.000
(1) 386 0.575 0.494
Active search (0) 454 0.5 0.5 −1.656 0.049 0.098 0.951
(1) 34 0.647 0.485
Pre-trip search (0) 472 0.513 0.5 −0.611 0.271 0.541 0.729
(1) 17 0.588 0.507
Kerb search (0) 406 0.529 0.499 1.562 0.946 0.119 0.059
(1) 89 0.438 0.498
Figure 3
Distribution of the Misperception of the First Hour’s Parking Fee by Parkers, Measured as the Difference
Between Their Price Guess and the Actual Garage Fee
Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Information in the Parking Market Albalate and Gragera
329
2.2 Obfuscation
Another key aspect is the fact that price menus are only visible from the street (that is,
outside the facility) in 15 per cent of the garages in Barcelona. Around 78 per cent only
display this information inside the facility, while the remaining 7 per cent put up no visible
signs, thus forcing users to ask if they want to know the fee they will be charged.7 In our
sample, 70 per cent of respondents parked in garages that only show price information
inside the facility, while the remaining 30 per cent used garages displaying the fees outside.
All garages report their fees in terms of price per minute as stipulated by the 2006
Consumer Protection Act.8 In describing this fee, they tend to display the price as a fraction
using from between two and six decimal numbers, which makes it fairly difficult for
customers to compute the actual price. Many garages do not apply a flat fee but rather
use a differentiated rate per minute depending on the length of stay, generally decreasing
with duration. Garages also generally report all available discounts for overnight and
next-day stays in their price menus.
All these factors increase the complexity of the price menu and can potentially aid
garage operators in obfuscating their prices, making it more difficult for users to know
with any certainty the fee they will be charged (increasing parkers’ search cost). Here, we
include two measures to account for this potential price obfuscation. First, we measure
price salience as a dummy variable, given a value of 1 if the price is not made visible outside
the garage facility and 0 otherwise. Second, we account for the complexity in the way in
which garages report the fee per minute, the length-of-stay price differentiation and
discounts taking advantage of the coded price-menu string length, computed as the
number of characters that this contains. The average price complexity faced by the respon-
dents on our survey is 38 characters (std. dev. 27 characters) and its distribution is shown in
Figure 4. Examples of some of these coded price menus and their corresponding complexity
are reported in Table 3.
2.3 The value of information: expected gains versus search cost
So far, we have seen that drivers in Barcelona conduct very low levels of search, which
based on previous evidence is plausibly explained by its potentially high associated
costs.9 It is rational to believe that drivers will only involve themselves in a search if the
marginal gain to be achieved by conducting such a search is higher than or equal to its
marginal cost. Thus, we can measure a parker’s expected gains from having perfect infor-
mation as the difference between the mean fee for the first hour of parking and the lowest
garage fee within the relevant market reported by each respondent; that is, a buffer zone
defined by its lying within walking distance of the parker’s final destination. This provides
us with an intuition as to what would be the difference in the parking fee paid by a perfectly
7The provision of information in public-access garages is regulated by law 40/2002, but operators are only required
to ‘make prices easily visible prior to formalizing the service contract’; nothing is said about the format, the means,
or where this should be done (http://consum.gencat.cat/temes_de_consum/aparcaments/index.html). Note that
reporting the price inside the facility imposes a high cost on users if, on learning the fee, they opt not to park
in the facility.
8Ley 44/2006, de 29 de diciembre, de Mejora de la Protección de los Consumidores y Usuarios.
9Unfortunately, the low number of parkers that engage in search activity precludes us from taking a more
sophisticated, more reliable empirical approach to the estimation of this search cost.
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informed driver with respect to that of the expected market price paid by a user when
simply purchasing at random, other things being equal.
In our sample, this yields a E0.30/hr differential (std. dev. E0.27/hr), at which point the
user has a relatively mild incentive to search. Note that this potential cost saving is roughly
equivalent to the users’ price misperception, suggesting that they might not even be aware
that such a saving exists.
When analysing the deviation from perfect information, computed as the difference
between the lowest market price and the fee actually paid for the first hour of parking,
this yields a mean value of −E0.17/hr (std. dev. E0.27/hr), indicating that users
purchase at higher prices than the lowest fee possible. When analysing the deviation
from purchasing at random, measured as the difference between the mean fee for the
first hour of parking within the relevant market and the price actually paid, this yields a
mean value of E0.13/hr (std. dev. E0.31/hr), suggesting that parkers do possess some
Figure 4
Distribution of the Price Complexity Faced by Parkers, Measured as the Number of Characters Included in the
Price Menu Coded String
Table 3
Example of Different Price Menus Faced by Respondents in Our Sample
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information that allows them to purchase at a price that is lower than the expected market
price.
To obtain a clearer picture we need to compare this expected gain of having perfect
information with its expected cost (search). We have no data about the drivers’ search
process, but we can provide an accurate enough approximation of the expected costs
with a back-of-the-envelope calculation, assuming that parkers follow a sequential search
approach.10 This is an equivalent problem to that of computing the probability of a
driver picking the cheapest garage option from a sample without replacement (assuming
all garages are equally distant from the driver’s final destination). Under this scenario,
the probability of locating the cheapest facility is 1/n, where n is the number of garages
in the relevant market. Using the mean values in our sample, we can compute the mean
expected cost of a sequential search assuming there are four garages (std. dev. 2.9 garages)
located 200 m apart (std. dev. 97 m), and where parkers drive from one facility to another at
a velocity of 10 km/hr and their time is valued at E9/hr.11 The probability of finding oneself
at the cheapest garage on the first visit is 0.25, as it is on the second, third, and fourth visits
conditional on failures on the previous visits. Thus, the expected search cost would be
E1.87, which well offsets the previously computed expected gains for the respondents in
our sample.
To translate this result more broadly across the whole city, the average value of perfect
information in Barcelona is E0.67/hr (std. dev. E0.29/hr) and its distribution can be
depicted as in Figure 5 (based on the data reported in Albalate and Gragera, 2017).
From this figure, however, it is readily seen that in many areas this is too low to offset
the assumed search cost. Indeed, those sites with the higher values of information are
precisely those with the higher number of competing facilities. This implies that even
though expected gains might be higher, they might well also be offset by higher search
costs if the drivers’ main channel for gaining information is an on-site search. The more
garages that are available, the greater the number of visits a user will be expected to
make to find the cheapest fee.
Table 4 shows detailed expected search costs per garage visited, suggesting it is very
unlikely that drivers will search for more than two garage facilities given the value yielded
by perfect information.
Additionally, we also find evidence that conducting an active search for a garage does
not actually help drivers find the cheapest parking option for their current trip. On the
contrary, those that do conduct such a search end up with an average lower deviation
from the mean price, meaning they are less able to purchase at lower than the mean
price, which does not differentiate from purchasing at random. This is a reflection of just
how poor information actually is in this market. Indeed, the search might only constitute
10We believe this constitutes a fair enough approximation of the expected search costs, as very few drivers under-
take a pre-trip search and parking information systems/platforms, as yet, enjoy little market penetration.
Moreover, in our particular setting the only way to dispose of complete knowledge of all garage prices (in the
vast majority of cases) would be to visit each facility, this without taking into account the fact that fees are usually
not visible from the outside (imposing an additional cost if consumers want to know the price) and the cognitive
burden that the price discrimination scheme might also impose.
11Drivers’ value of time is assumed at E9/hr following the estimates of SAIT (2015), the cost-benefit analysis guide
for transport investments of the Catalonia Regional Government.
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a cost in terms of gathering information (through experience) for future visits to the area.
Table 5 reports the results of a t-test, comparing the means for the subsamples of respon-
dents that conduct active searches and those who do not.
To overcome their lack of knowledge and potentially high search costs, drivers appear
to adhere to their already known options, with 77 per cent selecting the garage facility based
on previous experience (as long as they are satisfied with it). Alternatively, they seem to rely
on brand names as an indication of a garage’s attributes, and here 80 per cent of respon-
dents report knowing at least some of the main garage brand names. This argument is in
line with evidence from the consumer behaviour literature (Beales et al., 1981).
Figure 5
Value of Perfect Information (E/hr) in Each Garage Catchment Area, Measured as the Difference Between
Minimum and Mean First Hour’s Parking Fee Within a 500-m Buffer Around Each Facility
Table 4
Expected Search Cost Assumed for a Sequential Search Strategy
at Mean Values in Our Sample for Each Visited Facility
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In short, the descriptive evidence presented shows that when choosing a garage drivers
conduct very little search (of any kind); know very little about the stock of available
alternatives and their prices; appear to rely heavily on previous experience; face relatively
low expected marginal gains with respect to the marginal search cost; and are exposed to
the potential obfuscation strategies employed by garages that might further increase their
costs.
3.0 Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Information on Prices Paid
The above section has provided compelling evidence of the informational frictions in the
parking market. However, what is relevant is not how much drivers do not know about
their parking options and prices or how many of them are inadequately informed, but
whether their lack of information means that market outcomes deviate from the perfect
competition scenario. Thus, next we test whether the level of information has an impact
on the price paid by parkers and whether garages’ obfuscation strategies might further
increase parking fees.
3.1 Model specifications
The intuition on which our approach is based is that perfectly informed drivers would be
capable of accurately identifying available garage options and their characteristics
(including prices) and, consequently, of maximising the utility they obtain from their
choice of garage. Other things being equal, they should be able to choose a cheaper parking
option. Those with inferior information levels might just be able to partially optimise their
decision, whereas uninformed parkers can be expected simply to purchase at random. The
level of information will depend on previous parking experiences associated with the area in
which the trip destination is located or on their having conducted any type of search (pre-
trip or on-site) to at least establish a subset of available garage parking opportunities. We
test this hypothesis by estimating three types of model.
First, we estimate a regression model of the price paid for the first hour’s parking on the
information level of the drivers and on the provision of information from the garages
(Model 1). This gives us an idea of whether the conditional mean price for the whole
sample is affected by the parkers’ knowledge and search activity; that is, whether infor-
mation dimensions result in parkers paying higher or lower fees. In order to have
Table 5
One-Tailed and Two-Tailed T-test Results Comparing the Deviation with Respect to Mean Prices for Different
Independent Subsamples Based on Parkers’ Active Search Involvement
Parkers’
characteristic
Deviation from mean price
Freq. Mean Std. Dev. t Pr(T , t) Pr(|T| . |t|) Pr(T . t)
Active search (0) 458 0.131 0.314 1.401 0.919 0.162 0.081
(1) 34 0.053 0.268
Note: Deviation from the mean prices is measured as the difference between the mean prices and the price actually
paid for the first parking hour.
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comparable prices across respondents, we use the first hour’s parking fee (list price), as was
stated in the questionnaire when asking parkers for their price perception. We estimate
Model 1 with a log-linear specification, so the coefficients reported can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities:
Log(Fi) = a · active searchi + b · passive searchi + g · obfuscationi + d · controlsi + 1i. (1)
Second, as it is plausible that there might be decreasing marginal returns on search making
it non-optimal for drivers to be fully informed (Ratchford, 1980), we estimate three binary
outcome models regressing: (a) the probability of paying the lowest fee for the first hour’s
parking; (b) the probability of paying less than the mean fee for the first hour’s parking; and
(c) the probability of paying more than the mean fee for the first hour’s parking within the
relevant market given the information dimensions (Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively).12 In
contrast to Model 1, these models give us an idea of how well drivers choose between
the available garages lying in their relevant market in terms of price. They estimate how
much more or less likely a user is to park in a garage in a specific price segment in relation
to a change in the dimension of information. Dichotomous response variables are simply
computed by comparing the fee users pay for their first hour of parking and the mean
fee charged within the relevant market for each respondent. This means that the dependent
variable in Model 2 takes a value of 1 when Fi is equal to the minimum Fmin within the
relevant market for parker i and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Model 3 takes a
value of 1 when Fi is strictly lower than the mean fee ( F) within the relevant market for
parker i and 0 otherwise. In Model 4, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when Fi
is strictly higher than F within the relevant market for parker i and 0 otherwise. Note
that Models 3 and 4 can be considered reciprocal of each other. The estimates reported
by Models 2, 3, and 4 are the odds ratio for a logit regression model (exponentiated
coefficients):
Pr(Fi = Fmin|x)
= L(a · active searchi + b · passive searchi + g · obfuscationi + d · controlsi + 1i), (2)
Pr(Fi < F |x)
= L(a · active searchi + b · passive searchi + g · obfuscationi + d · controlsi + 1i), (3)
Pr(Fi > F |x)
= L(a · active searchi + b · passive searchi + g · obfuscationi + d · controlsi + 1i). (4)
Third, we estimate a regression model of the deviation from the mean fee within the relevant
market area (Model 5), in order to be able to quantify how much each information dimen-
sion contributes to the higher/lower deviation in price with respect to purchasing at random
(mean price). The dependent variable in Model 5 is defined as the difference ( F − Fi). This
yields a positive deviation when the price paid is lower than the mean fee, meaning that
12We assume that the relevant market for each respondent is a buffer defined by the walking distance to their final
destination in a radius around the garage facility in which the survey was conducted. The walking distance is
based on a reported walking time to final destination assuming a velocity of 0.6 m/sec.
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drivers are purchasing better than at random, presumably by having a greater under-
standing of the available stock of garages and their characteristics, and vice versa when
the deviation is negative. Model 5 reports the estimated coefficients for a linear regression
model:
( F − Fi) = a · active searchi + b · passive searchi + g · obfuscationi + d · controlsi + 1i. (5)
We include several information-related variables, as the consumer behaviour literature
suggests that consumers (drivers) might acquire/search for information from very different
sources, not only actively but passively from their past experiences or when involved in
other activities (Beales et al., 1981). It is clear that this information acquisition process
and its consequences in terms of consumer knowledge will depend on the technology of
information production and diffusion,13 the type and the level of complexity of its attri-
butes, the consumers’ ability to use information, the amount purchased, their experience
with the product, and their preferences and beliefs (Salop, 1976; Miller, 1993). Thus, we
seek to capture search activity by accounting for drivers actively looking for information
(active searchi), including a dummy variable that is equal to one when the driver has visited
at least another garage facility (and zero otherwise) and has also visited another when
conducting some kind of pre-trip search (and zero otherwise).14 We also seek to capture
passive information acquisition (passive searchi) by including a dummy equal to one
when the driver reports having previously searched for a kerbside spot (and zero otherwise),
when the driver has previously visited the garage facility and the frequency of the trip to
that specific destination, computed as the number of trips per month. In order to capture
broadly the level of knowledge acquired from previous experience, we introduce a dummy
equal to one when the driver reports knowing available garage alternatives in the area (and
broadly otherwise).
Additionally, we include a number of variables to account for the potential impact of
the obfuscation strategies adopted by garage operators that might increase the users’
search cost (obfuscationi), as highlighted in the previous section. We include a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 when the garage does not display the price outside the facility
(price not salient) and 0 otherwise, as well as a continuous variable that seeks to capture
price complexity in the way garages report the fee per minute, and price differentiation
linked to length of stay (price menu). We measure this by coding the price menus and
counting the number of characters they contain, so as to proxy the cognitive burden it
might represent to drivers seeking to compute the price due.
We should stress that our test does not depend on any assumptions regarding the users’
search behaviour or the technology of information production and diffusion, as we focus
solely on the impact of information levels on the price paid. However, the test does
depend on our ability to control for quality differences between garages. We control for
13Obviously, the costs associated with a web information search and those associated with driving to visit different
garage facilities can differ considerably.
14It could be argued that the amount of search can be determined by the prices faced, suggesting a potential
endogeneity issue. However, previous evidence reported in Section 2.1 shows that drivers tend to have very
poor knowledge of prices and available alternatives, where our results suggest that those searching end up
worse off; making it difficult to assume reverse causality. As a robustness check we estimate the models without
this variable, and results remain consistent.
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garage characteristics in terms of operator-specific effects, potential differences in garage
attractiveness, and the level of garage competition, as well as competitive and locational
advantages.
Operator-specific effects are included to account for quality differences, given that each
operator tends to meet a set of standards as regards facility layout, parking spaces, and
signalling, which can be assumed to yield similar user experiences. We control for differ-
ences in attractiveness of the area (which might enable users to achieve higher levels of
utility by combining multiple activities for the same length of stay) by the density of
economic activities. This is measured as the ratio between the number of square metres
of economic activities that lay in the area of the relevant market for each user. The level
of competing garage alternatives in the area is measured as the average distance between
the garages located within the relevant market for each parker. As a measure of market
dominance and to account for the competitive advantage of each garage, we introduce
the share of competitors owned by the operator of the facility in which the driver left
their car. Finally, a garage’s locational advantage is measured by the time taken to walk
to the parker’s final destination.
We also control for the heterogeneity of driver and trip characteristics. We include sex,
age, and vehicle price as driver traits. Vehicle price is used as an income proxy and is
computed as the actual selling price of the vehicle reported as being driven by the
respondent.15 We also include information about the purpose of the trip for which we
establish four categories: work/study, business, shopping/leisure, and personal (most of
them medical appointments). We also control for the length of the stay in the garage, as
this might also give parkers higher expected gains due to greater total parking expenditure.
Likewise, it may also make it more difficult for the users to make sense of the price menu
when price discrimination is applied.
3.2 Results and discussion
Results for all models are reported in Table 6. For the sake of clarity, the table does not
include control variables. Operator-specific effects are found always to be statistically sig-
nificant, while the density of economic activities, level of competing garage alternatives,
competitive and locational advantage measures, trip purpose, and length of parking stay
show statistically significant coefficients in various models.16 Note that the number of
observations varies across logit models (Models 2–4) because by controlling for
operator-specific effects means that both success and failure needs to be observed for
each of them. Some operators’ associated observations are dropped to avoid perfect
collinearity.
The results reported in Table 6 suggest that active information acquisition (either by
garage, kerbside, or pre-trip search) does not have a statistically significant impact on the
level of prices paid (Model 1). Models 3–5 suggest that when parkers conduct some
15This is calculated using an internet price information aggregator (coches.com). As a robustness check, we also
include a depreciated vehicle value, taking into account the car purchase year as reported by the respondent.
16We find very mild evidence that the level of price paid is inelastic with respect to walking time to final destination
and no significant differences with respect to search involvement. Our data and empirical approach do not allow
us to test for the potential trade-off between drivers’ propensity to search and the desire to park close to their final
destination. This is an interesting issue for further research.
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search for alternative garages, they end up paying higher than mean prices. Model 4
suggests that drivers that search for alternative garages are more than twice as likely to
purchase above the mean price within their relevant market. Specifically, Model 5 shows
they end up paying E0.13/hr above the mean fee for the first hour. This suggests that an
on-site search might be too much of an inconvenience for consumers who are inadequately
informed and who are simply acquiring experience that will only pay off in future visits to
the area. This seems to indicate that information frictions in the case of Barcelona are quite
extreme, if parkers are unable to achieve gains from an active search.
Passive information acquisition seems to be a more important determinant of the trans-
lation of user knowledge into market outcomes. Models 3–5 suggest that having some
knowledge about the available garage parking stock increases the likelihood that parkers
are able to make a better purchase than a simple random purchase. Model 3 suggests
that these users are twice as likely to purchase at a price below that of the mean fee for
the first hour within their relevant market. More specifically, Model 5 shows that they
Table 6











Depend. Var. Log (F) Pr(F = Fmin) Pr(F < F) Pr(F > F) ( F–F)
Search garage 0.00898 0.380 0.421* 2.378* −0.128**
(0.0130) (0.352) (0.209) (1.182) (0.0501)
Search kerb 0.000167 1.307 0.628 1.593 −0.00988
(0.0106) (0.524) (0.263) (0.668) (0.0460)
Search pre-trip 0.000806 1.279 1.403 0.713 −0.0788
(0.0225) (1.421) (1.006) (0.512) (0.0772)
Know alternatives −0.00777 1.501 2.165** 0.462** 0.0872**
(0.00866) (0.545) (0.658) (0.140) (0.0379)
Prev. visitor −0.00391 0.627 0.844 1.185 −0.0105
(0.0110) (0.305) (0.329) (0.462) (0.0462)
Trip frequency −0.00216** 1.098** 1.115*** 0.897*** 0.00837
(0.000948) (0.0438) (0.0414) (0.0333) (0.00582)
Price not salient 0.124*** 0.405** 0.0326*** 30.67*** −0.169**
(0.0112) (0.180) (0.0189) (17.76) (0.0666)
Price complexity 0.000572*** 1.001 1.004 0.996 0.000268
(0.000160) (0.00638) (0.00743) (0.00737) (0.000621)
Constant 0.814*** 75.32*** 400.3*** 0.00250*** 0.377*
(0.0381) (112.0) (593.7) (0.00370) (0.211)
Observations 318 198 288 288 318
R2/pseudo-R2 0.633 0.185 0.259 0.259 0.199
Note: Operator-specific effects and other control variables are not reported in the table. Model (1) estimated
parameters can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. Models (2)–(4) estimates are reported as odds ratios (exponen-
tiated coefficients). Model (5) estimates are reported in levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
*** p , 0.01, ** p , 0.05, * p , 0.1.
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purchase at a price that is E0.09/hr below the mean price, which is half the search cost
assumed for a single garage visit in the sequential search scheme reported in Table 4.
Trip frequency shows a mild negative relation with the level of prices paid (Model 1), the
sign being in line with Sorensen (2000). Here, our results seem to suggest that familiarity
with an area slightly facilitates the information gathering process. Models 2–4 suggest
that trip frequency slightly increases the probability of purchasing at the lowest available
price and below the mean price, with odds ratios of 1.098 and 1.115, respectively.
However, Model 5 shows that the deviation in price from the mean is not statistically
significant. This suggests that trip frequency helps them just to purchase slightly better
than at random, but not adding much to the broader knowledge measure of available
garage stock.
One of our most important results is that we find compelling evidence to indicate that
price obfuscation may well be of great relevance in the case of garage parking in Barcelona.
Model 1 suggests that drivers that park at garages where the price is not salient end up
paying higher prices (12 per cent). The likelihood of purchasing at the lowest available
price is cut by more than half (Model 2) and drivers are about 30 times more likely to
purchase above mean prices (Model 4). Model 5 suggests that parkers presented with
non-salient prices purchase E0.17/hr above the mean fee for the first hour’s parking;
that is, about the same magnitude of the search cost for a single garage visit. We also
find a positive relation between the price complexity of a price menu and the price paid
by parkers (Model 1), even though this does not seem to have a statistically significant
impact on the probability of purchasing below the mean or at the lowest available price.
In this regard, it might only raise awareness about the potential obfuscation implications
of price discrimination in relation to length of stay, which might have some relevance for
the implementation of policy interventions.
All this suggests that information frictions are so pervasive in Barcelona that the only
way in which garage users can currently overcome them is by acquiring a considerable
amount of consumer experience. A casual survey of different cities suggests that there are
no significant differences in garage signage and information provision with respect to
Barcelona. The fact that parking finders and reservation service apps are expanding
suggests that the need for parking information is quite ubiquitous. Penetration rates may
differ between cities (presumably depending on the value of information and search
cost), but parking app companies reported the number of users seem to suggest that they
are still far from full adoption. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that information fric-
tions are also to be found in other cities and that their importance is a factor that needs to
be investigated further.
This has obvious implications for spatial competition models for parking, which to date
have assumed perfect information when making their policy recommendations, but which
might well be hindered by the effects of information frictions. However, it also has impli-
cations for empirical studies that implicitly make the same assumption when parkers
choose between kerbside and garage parking. In this sense, the previously reported kerbside
premium (Kobus et al., 2013; Gragera and Albalate, 2016) might be partially capturing
garage information frictions rather than just a greater willingness to pay for kerbside
parking.
Public authorities need to address this issue of imperfect information as it might be
giving rise to substantial welfare losses and conferring additional market power on
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garage operators, while at the same time hindering public interventions to eliminate
cruising-for-parking.
4.0 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the existence of imperfect information in the garage
parking market of the city of Barcelona. We conducted a survey among garage users at
different facilities throughout Barcelona, gathering information on their trip and demo-
graphic characteristics, search activity, and their knowledge of prices and the alternatives
available. Based on these data, we provide compelling evidence of the degree of information
frictions in this market, while testing whether the level of information affects parkers’
garage choice behaviour which, in turn, translates into market outcomes (prices).
On the one hand, we find that active information acquisition (either by garage, kerbside,
or pre-trip search) does not ensure that parkers end up paying lower fees for a given trip. On
the contrary, drivers that do conduct a search are more likely to end up paying more. On the
other hand, passive information acquisition through experience (broad knowledge of avail-
able garage stock and trip frequency) seems to be a more relevant determinant of parkers
finding cheaper parking options. Additionally, we find compelling evidence to indicate that
price obfuscation is a determinant of market outcomes in Barcelona, and that this may
allow garage operators to take advantage of garage users’ lack of knowledge.
This implies that information frictions are so pervasive in Barcelona that the only way in
which drivers might overcome them is by drawing on their consumer experience. While we
await a more extensive penetration of information platforms, on-site search may well be the
price less informed consumers have to pay to acquire information through experience, an
effort that will only reap dividends in future visits to the area. Note, however, that we
should be cautious about the generalisation of these results to other cities and contexts.
On the one hand, there are not significant differences in garage signage and information
provision and the fact that the need for parking information is quite ubiquitous suggest
that information frictions may apply to other cities. On the other hand, some features of
the parking market in Barcelona might exacerbate the magnitude of the information
frictions, such as the low penetration of information platforms or the extremely atomised
garage market with plenty of small operators. The relevance of this issue in the parking
market will depend on the complex interplay between market structure and search costs
(and the incentives to be informed). For that reason, we believe it is important to study
other cities with different urban forms, mobility patterns, and parking market features,
to evaluate their precise role on information frictions.
Our findings suggest that addressing information frictions is a relevant policy issue if
what is sought is efficiency of the parking market. Previous studies suggest that market
interventions tend to miss a relevant issue that might impede any potential welfare gains,
if they disregard such frictions. In this respect, in the presence of imperfect information,
garages tend to exercise additional market power and even to act strategically to increase
driver search cost through price obfuscation. This means that even so-called optimal inter-
ventions must face the fact that some cruising is likely to remain, simply because parkers are
unaware of the available garage stock and their prices. Thus, before implementing theoreti-
cally based interventions, imperfect information needs to be addressed.
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In order to correct this distortion of the parking market, public intervention is required.
Information is a public good and private agents are unlikely to have the incentives to
provide optimal information quantity and quality. Ensuring parkers are better informed
in all aspects of parking transactions will require a huge amount of data and standardis-
ation procedures, which are likely to be costly. The fact that information gathering firms
are emerging rapidly in the parking market, combined with the level of development
achieved by parking assistance systems, available technology, and SmartCity schemes,
leads us to think that in the near future, information availability will be ubiquitous and
pervasive in urban systems. A commitment on the part of public authorities to the data-
gathering process (curbing costs) and to offering the right incentives to garage operators
to disclose up-to-date information is clearly desirable here. Likewise, closer collaboration
between public authorities, information-gathering firms, and market stakeholders should
also be encouraged. Finally, it should perhaps be stressed that there is evidence that
improved provision of pricing information can result in something of a backlash insofar
as it can lead to easier collusion; thus, closer monitoring of the market is recommended.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse distortions attributable to
imperfect information in the car parking sector. Our findings represent a relevant contri-
bution to both theoretical models and empirical studies of parking, as they stress the
need to take information frictions into account given their tendency to exacerbate effects
on the cruising externality and garage market power. We believe their market implications
should receive greater attention in future research.
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